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There seemed to be only one main road. Stepping off the train in Altdorf, we 
found ourselves in a small town in the middle of Switzerland, at the southeast-
ernmost tip of Lake Lucerne, surrounded by mountains. We took a bus, and 
 after some bends in the road, the screen finally showed “Dätwyler AG”—the 
cable producer we planned to visit. Next to the bus stop were a couple of flat, 
gray workshop and office buildings. Just beside them, cows were grazing, and 
behind the buildings the steep, forested foot of a mountain emerged. Once 
inside the factory, we heard the constant humming and buzzing of the ma-
chines. They seemed to be operating autonomously, although under cautious 
human observation. Only occasionally, a worker would halt them to start a new 
strand of cables, carefully adapting the machine to the right speed and dis-
tance, ensuring that the different parts that would form a specific fiber optic 
cable would fit well. To protect the fibers, the fiber optic cable part of the fac-
tory was warmer than the other parts, and the light shirts of the workers stood 
in contrast to their heavy black work shoes. 
For the workers, many of whom come from other 
countries, such as Turkey or Croatia, the shift work in the factory is an integral 
part of their everyday lives in Switzerland. At the same time, people  outside 
of Altdorf seem to be barely aware of the existence of this rather unexciting 
factory. Nevertheless, much of the Internet traffic in Switzerland  actually 
passes through and depends on the cables produced there. For example, sev-
eral thick strands of Dätwyler cables run through the Milchbuck tunnel in 
 Zurich, forming the backbone of the city’s telecommunications network. The 
cables are a crucial component for enabling digitalization in the first place. 
What is more, they are also an important component of  Switzerland’s intri-
cate global digital connections.
Making raw fibers is technically most demanding 
and is currently not done in Switzerland.1 However, the production of fiber  optic 
cables is not an easy enterprise either. As several Dätwyler employees 
 explained, the complex and lengthy process of manufacturing fiber optic 
 cables includes coloring the raw fibers, producing a thin colored cable con-
taining twelve or twenty-four fibers, and stranding a number of these thin 
 cables into even thicker cables that may contain up to 500 fibers. In the pro-
cess, it is important to handle the delicate fibers carefully as well as to let them 
rest after each step in production. Twisting the fibers too much breaks them, 
and touching them with bare hands deeply affects their transmission  capacity. 
Moreover, the different colors are of particular importance. During the produc-
tion process, they make it possible to trace back the origin of each individual 
fiber. Later, when the cables are laid and connected, the colors allow techni-
1
Fiber optics or optical fibers com-
monly consist of a glass core that 
guides the light and a surrounding 
glass cladding that prevents the 
light from leaking. There are differ-
ent processes for making the fib-
ers. These include producing a pre-
form from fused silica glass in an 
initial step. This preform contains 
both core and cladding. In a second 
step, the preform is heated and 
 fibers are drawn away from it. The 
biggest challenge is making the 
preform. Further challenges are 
achieving the  extreme transpar-
ency required for communication 
as well as making thin, uniform fibers. 
See Jeff Hecht, Understanding 
Fiber Optics, 5th ed. Auburndale, 
MA, 2017, pp. 125–37. To serve as 
media for telecommunications, the 
raw fibers have to be transformed 
into proper cables. 
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cians to differentiate between the up to 500 fibers and ensure that the data 
passing through these cables will find their correct destination. Accordingly, 
producing a fiber optic cable takes between four and six weeks.2
Not only that, many of these cables are customized 
products, meaning that they cannot be produced ahead of orders and kept in 
stock. The cables have to meet the requirements of specific customers. These 
include practical and technical issues: for example, whether a cable runs 
 parallel to a high-voltage installation up in the air, undersea, or alongside 
tremor ing train tracks; whether it is round, passing through ducts, or flat, serv-
ing  elevators; whether it has to be fireproof or is buried directly in the ground; 
and whether it connects continents, data centers, or individual households. 
Different customers have different quality and color-code expectations. In 
 addition, political and competition requirements may apply.3 For example, 
 Switzerland’s fiber-to-the-home network, in which partly state-owned 
 Swisscom is the main player, is based on the so-called four-fiber model.  Other 
countries have different models.4 Finally, the fiber optic industry is  particularly 
 d ynamic. Not only do the raw fibers keep changing—by becoming thinner, for 
example—but the development of the other components that make up a  fiber 
optic network is also a continuous process.5
These other network components are also called 
active or opto-electronic components. They are powered components that 
can manipulate signals, for example by controlling the intensity of light or by 
amplifying the signal strength in order to enhance data transfer. Moreover, 
they can convert signals, when linking fiber optics to other communications 
infrastructures such as wireless networks or copper wires.6 In the 1980s and 
’90s, the global centers of fiber optic and component research were the  United 
States and Japan in particular, and to some extent Western Europe ( especially 
the United Kingdom, France, and West Germany).7 However, in the past two 
decades, Chinese companies such as ZTE and Huawei Technologies have 
 become serious competitors, challenging the world order of the fiber optics 
industry.8 The latter company has gained a strong foothold in Switzerland, 
where it cooperates with numerous companies, including with Dätwyler 
 Cabling in the area of data centers.9 
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IGI Consulting, China Telecom 
 Volume 2: Fiber Optics Markets 
and Opportunities, Boston, MA, 
2001, p. 101.
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See, for example, Perez Bien,  “Under 
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5G Plans at MWC  Barcelona,” South 
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Meanwhile, Dätwyler has also become an estab-
lished cable producer in China, where it has equipped numerous flagship sites 
and institutions with cables, such as Shanghai’s Oriental Pearl Tower, major 
airports, a Communist Party school and a Huawei data center.10 Like an  emblem 
of its intimate connection to China, a model of the Chinese Dätwyler factory 
now furnishes the entrance of the company’s showroom in Altdorf. 
Taken together, Dätwyler’s and Huawei’s Swiss- 
Chinese trajectories exemplarily challenge established ideas about the pre-
sumed global centers of modernity, of a one-way technology transfer from 
West to East, and of confining a given technology to the boundaries of a single 
nation. A closer look also highlights some of the everyday people behind the 
seemingly technical digital infrastructures and their global entanglement. 
 While economic relations between Switzerland and 
China can be traced back to the seventeenth century, these relations have 
 entered a new dimension in the past three decades. Since the 1990s, the two 
countries have become deeply entangled in the field of digital infrastructures. 
This was the time when the Internet went commercial and grew  exponentially, 
when globalization became a buzzword, and many North American, Japanese, 
and Western European companies greatly expanded their production activi-
ties abroad in fierce competition. They were grappling with overproduction, 
 labor shortages, rising wages, and falling market prices at home as well as ris-
ing production costs in once-popular overseas locations such as Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, Singapore, and South Korea. In the 1980s and ’90s, the People’s  Republic 
of China (PRC) became the new place to go. Under the leadership of Deng 
Xiaoping, the country had just undergone a decade of reform and opening up. 
It was moving rapidly from a planned, collective economy toward a market 
economy, eager to attract foreign capital, technology and know-how in order 
to catch up economically and regain a place in the global market.11 
Since the founding of the PRC in 1949, importing 
foreign technology and adapting it to make a new Chinese version has been 
an important way of creating an ostensibly modern and industrialized  China.12 
Information and communications technology (ICT) in particular was a key 
part of this strategy. ICT was central to the process of opening up, receiving 
special attention, and earning policy support in China.13 Foreign producers, 
in turn, felt especially attracted by the PRC’s new favorable investment 
 policies on the one hand, and the immense number of cheap rural migrant 
laborers on the other hand.14
The 1990s were also the time when a global fiber 
 optics industry emerged, paving the road for fiber optics to become the back-
9
Johannes Müller, Dätwyler  Cabling, 
personal interview, April 29, 2019.
10
Ibid. Dätwyler Cabling Solutions, 
“Reference Projects & Case Stu-
dies: China,” https://www.cabling. 
datwyler.com/en/reference- 
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New York, 2013, pp. 15–16; Maurice 
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3rd ed., New York, 1999, pp. 449–520.
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to China. The Case of Steam and 
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bone of digitalization. Research on fiber optics goes back several decades. The 
development of the laser in 1960 had made it worthwhile to give fiber optics a 
second look as transmission media. In the 1970s and ’80s, the thin, transpar-
ent glass fibers finally achieved the necessary purity, transmission capacity, 
and affordability to be used for wide-scale communication. In contrast to the 
older copper telecommunications networks, the advantage of fiber optics is 
that they can transmit large amounts of information at high speed and over 
long distances. Instead of electrical signals, they use optical signals, in the form 
of light.15 In the 1990s, the growth of the Internet and the unquenchable thirst 
for ever more bandwidth gave this technology new importance.16  Accordingly, 
a whole industry grew around this medium, ranging from the production of 
 preforms, raw fibers, cables, plugs, and racks, to laser and LED transmitters, 
connectors, amplifiers, receivers, and testing machines.17 
The most successful raw fiber producers were 
American and Japanese companies. Engaged in a head-to-head race with 
Japanese companies, the US enterprises were highly concerned about los-
ing their dominant position in the industry. As a US industry report from 1985 
notes: “The Japanese, in particular, are aggressively seeking business around 
the world”  18 —reminding us of similar remarks currently being made in the US 
about Chinese ICT companies. The major international raw fiber producers 
were AT&T and Corning in the US, as well as a range of Japanese companies, 
including Sumimoto Electric, Fujikura, and Furukawa Electric. The  latter two 
were also among the biggest cable manufacturers, along with Siecor, a for-
mer joint venture between the German firm Siemens and Corning.19 Around 
the same time, commercial fiber optic production also began in  other parts 
of the world, including in Switzerland. Among these producers was, for 
 example, STR, a subsidy of ITT—names that are now forgotten. Dätwyler, in 
contrast, flourished.
Dätwyler: From Altdorf to Taicang 
Even though Swiss economists and policy-makers 
might regret that Switzerland does not have its own Silicon Valley, medium- 
sized companies such as Dätwyler nevertheless play an important, though 
overlooked, role in the making of a global digital Switzerland. Similar to the big 
technologies was crucial for trig-
gering the development of the Chi-
nese electronic  industry. Yun Wen, 
“The Rise of Chinese Transnational 
ICT Corporations: The Case of 
 Huawei,” Vancouver, 2017), pp. 48–50.
13
 
Yu Hong, “Distinctive Characteristics 
of China’s Path of ICT Development: 
A Critical Analysis of  Chinese De-
velopmental Strategies in Light of 
the Eastern Asian Model,” 2008, 
pp. 457–59.
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See Jeff Hecht, City of Light: The 
Story of Fiber Optics, New York, 1999; 
Hecht 2017. According to Hecht, the 
idea behind fiber optics has its ori-
gins in the nineteenth century, when 
similar technologies were used to 
guide light for illu mination and for 
seeing inside the human body.
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Optics Industry,” Fiber and Inte-
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US and Japanese cable manufacturers, the Swiss company Dätwyler Cabling 
Solutions is able to look back on more than a century since its founding. The 
company has its roots in Draht- und Gummiwerke AG in Altdorf, in the Canton 
of Uri. In 1915, Adolf Dätwyler (1883–1958), the son of a farmer from Aargau, be-
came its director. He saved the company from bankruptcy, bought it, and later 
renamed it Dätwyler AG. In 1926, the company, which had specialized in wire and 
gum, began producing its first telephone cables. It successively added other 
types of products to its production portfolio, from automotive and pharmaceu-
tical products to food packaging and various types of cables. After several  trials 
and field tests in the early 1980s,20 the Dätwyler company began producing fib-
er optic cables commercially. This was in 1986, when the global fiber industry 
emerged—along with a few other Swiss companies such as cable  manufacturer 
Huber+Suhner AG and raw fiber producer Cabloptic S.A.21 The Dätwyler com-
pany produced fiber optic cables for both private and public communications 
networks in Switzerland, including for the Postal Telegraph and Telephone, 
PTT. It did not succeed at raw fiber production, however. A raw fiber factory in 
 Neuchâtel, which Dätwyler once purchased, was eventually sold. Instead, the 
company turned to importing fibers from the American company Corning.22 
The production of fiber optic cables was already un-
der the management of Adolf Dätwyler’s sons, Peter (1926–1993) and Max 
 Dätwyler (b. 1929). The two brothers, an engineer and a chemist respectively, 
assumed control of the company in 1958 and transformed it into a holding. They 
took the first steps abroad, making Dätwyler a global company. Both of them 
had received part of their professional training in the United States. Having first 
broadened their own horizons overseas, they set out to expand the company’s 
activities across the globe in the late 1960s.23 This was, as a company report 
states, “[i]n view of the very tight labor market in Switzerland and the  uncertainty 
regarding what Switzerland would face with the establishment of the  European 
Economic Community.”  24 The brothers therefore first turned to Europe and 
20
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conversation, March 1, 2020. Ka-
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Swiss Economic  Archive,  Basel.
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bought a gum factory in the Netherlands. In 1970, they founded a steel factory 
in Bottrop, West Germany. In the mid-1970s, parts of the Dutch factory were 
moved to Belgium, and later expanded to Italy and the United States. Numer-
ous other moves of the various company segments followed. One of the first 
activities in Asia was gum production in Thailand. Meanwhile, the first sales 
 activities of technical equipment as well as pharmaceuticals targeted Hong 
Kong and Taiwan as well as Indonesia.25 As of today, the Dätwyler Holding AG 
has more than 9,000 employees worldwide, 2,300 of whom are in China.26
Not until the early 1990s did the cable business move 
abroad as well. In 2012, it became a private sister company called Dätwyler 
 Cabling Solutions AG, which now has about 1,000 employees. The first Asian 
representative offices were opened in Singapore and Jakarta. In the late 1990s, 
the actual production of cables started in the PRC.27 As Johannes Müller, CEO 
of Dätwyler’s cable business since 2013, states, market entry in China was 
based on the company’s premise that “[production in] China is for China,” 
 because reimporting cables to Europe would not be competitive. The strate-
gy of producing in and for the PRC has resulted in a revenue from China that 
constitutes almost one third of the entire company revenue worldwide. 
 Johannes Müller himself has traveled to China about eighty times, where he 
even shook hands with Chinese president Xi Jinping.28
The person who established the Chinese  premises 
amidst the excitement in the 1990s at globalization and fiber optics was Hans 
Ulrich Dätwyler, a distant relative of the Dätwyler company. According to him, 
the China story of Dätwyler Cabling unfolded along two paths. First, then 
CEO Robert Lombardini attended a seminar organized by the Swiss Office 
of Commercial Expansion (today Switzerland Global Enterprise), which 
convinced him to expand to the PRC. Mr. Lombardini thus established a pro-
ject group that was to evaluate the feasibility of a Sino-Swiss joint venture. 
Hans Ulrich Dätwyler led the group. Assisted by the audit and advisory firm 
KPMG and the Swiss-Chinese Chamber of Commerce, the group received 
a thick folder containing a preselection of potential partners among the 
 cable factories in China. From these, they selected and visited five factories 
near Shanghai in 1996 and ’97.29 
At that point, there were approximately 120 Chinese 
optical cable manufacturers in the PRC.30 These entered the fiber optic indus-
try around the same time as companies elsewhere. However, compared to their 
global competitors, they often lacked longstanding experience in glasswork or 
cable manufacturing, and the industry initially faced some difficulties.  Research 
and trial production of fiber manufacturing in China began in the 1970s, i.e. in 
25
Dätwyler Holding AG 1990, pp. 8–9, 
p. 37; Dätwyler Holding AG, “Ge-
schäftsbericht 1994,” Altdorf, 1995, 
pp. 12–13, Swiss Economic Archive, 
Basel; Dätwyler Holding AG, 
“Geschäftsbericht 1996,” Altdorf, 
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 | Fig. 1 |  Color-coded optical fiber strands.
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 | Fig. 2 |  Fiber strands come color-coded in twelve basic colors, here green.
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 | Fig. 3 |  Fiber stranding: Single fiber strands are being grouped together to form a loose tube.
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 | Fig. 4 |  Cable drums with so-called loose tubes.
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the final years of the socialist era under Mao Zedong. From then until 1988, to 
jump-start the industry, ten still mostly state-owned Chinese companies 
 imported optical fiber manufacturing equipment from Finland, the UK, France, 
Germany, and the United States. These Chinese companies mostly failed, how-
ever. Among the survivors were joint ventures with Fujikura of Japan, Lucent 
Technologies (spun off from AT&T), and the Dutch firm Philips. The other com-
panies succumbed to a lack of funding and lacking complementary industries. 
Moreover, they resigned from making fiber optics because of the high cost of 
acquiring technology and know-how, especially with regard to the most chal-
lenging part of fiber production, i.e. preform manufacturing. Subsequently, 
some of them turned to producing fiber optic cables instead of raw fibers. Like 
Dätwyler, they, too, imported most of their preforms or fibers from Corning.31 
The Chinese cable companies, however, expanded their production know-how 
in steps, first with regard to fiber and then to preform production.  Subsequently, 
by the mid-2000s, the Chinese fiber optics and cable industry had become one 
of the largest in the world 32, and now, the PRC can be considered a third center 
of preform production, on a par with the United States and Japan.33
In the 1980s and ’90s, the situation was still differ-
ent, however, and foreign technical know-how was in high demand. One of the 
Chinese cable companies that emerged out of this context and that made its 
way onto the Dätwyler shortlist was Zhongtian Cable Co., Ltd. (now part of the 
Jiangsu Zhongtian Technology Group, ZTT). The choice was rather intuitive, 
says Hans Ulrich Dätwyler.34 Nevertheless, on January 28, 1998, the two com-
panies officially created a joint venture  35 and it was through Zhongtian that 
Dätwyler managed to enter the Chinese cable market. As Hans Ulrich  Dätwyler 
remembers, what seemed to be close to Shanghai on the map, however, was 
actually worlds apart. Zhongtian was located in Rudong, a town in the country-
side of China’s Jiangsu Province, north of Shanghai. When he traveled there 
for the first time in 1996 to meet his partner, Zhongtian’s President Xu, the trip 
29
Hans Ulrich Dätwyler, personal 
 interview, September 17, 2019. Karl
Lüönd and Christoph Zurfluh, Die
Kraft der unscheinbaren Dinge: 
100 Jahre Dätwyler, Zürich, 2015,
pp. 189–90.
30
IGI Consulting, China Telecom 
 Volume 2: Fiber Optics Markets 
and Opportunities, Boston, MA, 
2001, p. 101.
31
IGI Consulting 2001, pp. 101–07; 
Xiaolan Fu, China’s Path to Innova-
tion, Cambridge, 2015, pp. 242–43. 
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Research and Markets, “Global 
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4832645 (retrieved December 12, 
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Hans Ulrich Dätwyler, personal 
 interview, September 17, 2019.
35
Feng Gao , “ ——
Long shang xing——Zhongtian 
 Deteweile youxian gongsi zhounian 
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 Shanghai Computer 
Weekly 185, no. 09 (1999), p. 10.
seemed adventurous to him. He had to travel 200 kilometers north from 
Shanghai to Rudong. Accompanied by lots of chickens, he had to cross Asia’s 
longest river, the Yangtze, by boat. According to Hans Ulrich Dätwyler, when 
he arrived, many of the locals greeted him with astonishment. It seemed to 
him that it was the first time they had met a Westerner: “People looked at us 
as if we were extraterrestrials.”  36
The delegation was accompanied by two key indi-
viduals, Mrs. Sui, a professor from Peking University, and China expert and 
lawyer Esther Nägeli of the Chamber of Commerce’s legal chapter. Both were 
crucial confidants who gave legal and intercultural advice to the negotiators. 
According to Hans Ulrich Dätwyler, this was important, as the negotiations 
were not easy. Initially, written contracts did not seem to mean much to their 
Chinese counterpart, who kept changing the terms every other day. On both 
sides, there was a lot of mistrust that had to be reduced. One way to build up 
trust was to eat and drink with the Chinese company employees and the local 
Party secretary. Pointing to a photo that shows him making a toast, he recalls, 
“I never had to drink so much [alcohol] in my life!”—a common way of forging 
business relations in the PRC. His wife, who joined him in 1998, adds that 
sometimes they had to eat things like a “red mush” that seemed horrific to 
them because they were unable to identify what it was and were not accus-
tomed to it. “People wanted to touch us,” she remembers. “Almost nobody 
spoke English, street signs were written only in Chinese, and when we went 
to the restaurant, we just had to point at something, because the menu was 
only in Chinese… . We were totally unprepared.”  37
Of course, the Dätwylers were not the first Swiss 
businesspeople in the telecommunications sector to have such seemingly 
 exotic experiences in East Asia. In 1984, for example, the Standard Telephon 
und Radio AG newsletter STR Impuls printed a similar report by Jens Alder, who 
established a business in South Korea, calling himself “a product manager on 
the front.” A year later, an export manager wrote a report jokingly entitled “Frog 
Stomachs, Bear Paws, and Flamingo Steaks.” The report described his team’s 
trip to China, where they participated in a telecommunications sales fair in 
Guangzhou organized by Swisscom. At that time, STR was already producing 
telecommunications equipment for the Swiss PTT in a joint venture factory in 
Shanghai.38 While such experiences from “the front” were quite typical then, 
what did change was the systematic nature of such entanglements. 
In the late 1990s, the second path that led the 
 Dätwylers to the People’s Republic was an invitation from the Schindler com-
pany, a Swiss producer of elevators. The two companies had previously 
36
Hans Ulrich Dätwyler, personal 
 interview, September 17, 2019. 
Lüönd and Zurfluh, 2015, pp. 189–90.
37
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 collaborated in Switzerland. Schindler had established the first-ever  Western 
industrial joint venture in China in 1980.39 Dätwyler made use of  Schindler’s 
production facilities in the city of Suzhou, near Shanghai, in 1998, where it 
 began manufacturing elevator cables for Schindler. As Hans Ulrich Dätwyler 
remembers: “We benefited from Schindler in that we had a stable workload 
from the first day onwards.”  40
Hans Ulrich Dätwyler had never imagined that he 
would be the one to go to China. At first, the couple did not expect to stay very 
long, but “three months turned into three years.” And, as Mr. Dätwyler asserts, 
“there were no young people around who were willing to go.” His children, in turn, 
were already grown up and he found the idea exciting, so “I just blundered into it.” 
While in China, they lived in Shanghai. According to 
the Dätwyler couple, they did not have a “godparent” who introduced them 
to the easier, though isolated, expat life. Instead, they lived in a thirty-story 
apartment building in a Chinese neighborhood. Instead of having a private 
driver, they traveled in cabs. While he had a Chinese assistant, who  i nterpreted 
and taught him the necessary cultural details, she regularly met with a lan-
guage exchange partner and learned from other expat women. When taking 
a cab, she always took along a card with their Chinese home address in order 
not to get lost—“because the cab drivers did not understand my pronuncia-
tion of the address.” In sum, says Ursula Dätwyler, “we were little prepared, 
but therefore experienced more.” 41
The move to China was arguably a bold one. During 
the planning phase, Hans Ulrich Dätwyler had met with numerous doubts 
from the parent company in Altdorf, because establishing a production site 
in China was a risky endeavor. It was helpful that he soon became the presi-
dent of the Swiss-Chinese Business Forum (today’s Swiss-Cham). That 
 position helped him to network and get to know the expat employees of Swiss 
companies such as Nestlé, Novartis, Sulzer, and Roche. In addition, talks in 
front of Chinese Party and economic representatives increased the appre-
ciation given him by the Chinese.42
Despite such conduits, however, the move towards 
the East has not always been easy. For one, the joint venture did not go well, due 
to conflicting interests: Zhongtian Cable was hoping to gain access to the 
 European market (and later succeeded in Germany),43 while the Dätwyler man-
agement was hoping to enter the Chinese market.44 The headquarters in 
 Altdorf were impatient and not satisfied with the results. Hans Ulrich Dätwyler 
had to demonstrate considerable effort at mediation and information to fend 
off skepticism, especially at home. In his words: “[I]t was almost more time- 
40
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consuming to convince the company management in Switzerland of the cor-
rectness of the business in China than to get it going locally.”  45
The company finally took over the joint venture by 
buying out the Chinese share, and also set up its own factory in Shanghai.46 
The Dätwyler couple recalls how they had to start from scratch at the new 
 location, buying their own folders and pencils and struggling to find staplers. 
Moreover, there was laundry hanging inside the office, because the migrant 
workers who constructed it also used it as living space. And when the govern-
ment suddenly decided to construct a subway line there, the company had to 
move again.47 Finally, in 2014, Dätwyler’s two Chinese production sites were 
combined in a new factory in Taicang in the north of Shanghai.48 By the end of 
the year 2000, Hans Ulrich Dätwyler had already returned to Switzerland. 
Looking back on his professional life, he says that “this was certainly one of 
the most interesting experiences.”
While Dätwyler Cabling Solutions successfully en-
tered the Chinese market, technology transfer did not occur in only one direc-
tion, of course. Today, different facets of a purported new Chinese modernity 
are also contributing to making Dätwyler part of a global digital Switzerland. 
These are occurring on both technical and social levels, whether with regard 
to specific technical components made in China and used by Dätwyler or with 
regard to collaborations with Chinese companies. For example, on a technical 
level, the stabilizing cores—also called “strength members”—of the bigger 
 cables produced in Altdorf are directly imported from China. Two large, black 
Chinese characters referring to Shanghai Xiao-Bao FRP Co., Ltd. reveal the 
 origin of these strength members, while they wait on bulky wooden reels to be 
processed on the Altdorf factory floor.49 In other words, the thick optical  cables 
that contain Chinese cores, American fibers, and Swiss coating technology, 
produced by workers from southeastern Europe, are thus really a multination-
al product spanning at least three continents.
On another, more social level, Dätwyler also cooper-
ates with the Chinese firm Huawei, which produces components for networks. 
Mr. Müller states that Huawei was willing to cooperate with the much smaller 
Dätwyler Cabling Solutions for several reasons: because Dätwyler already had 
a Chinese crew, which would ease communication, and because Huawei was 
interested in establishing long-term relationships; both companies had long-
term employees who had been collaborating with each other for years.  Finally, 
he adds, both stand for high quality, and being a Swiss company in China gen-
erally works better than being an American one: “it’s a question of trust!” 50 
 Accordingly, the comprehensive data center solutions offered by Dätwyler in 
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 Altdorf today also incorporate crucial Chinese know-how. Some decades ago, 
when the PRC was just on the verge of opening up, the fact that Chinese tech-
nology is now “modernizing” Swiss digital infrastructures would have been 
 unthinkable. Yet companies such as Huawei have by now become an impor-
tant part of digital Switzerland.
Huawei: From Shenzhen to Liebefeld 
In the mid-1980s, around the same time that the  fiber 
optic cable industry was emerging in Switzerland and elsewhere, a range of 
Chinese ICT companies began to appear as well. These included several 
 enterprises that are now widely familiar, such as Huawei, ZTE, TCL, Lenovo, 
and  Haier.51 Among these, Huawei in particular has become a key player with 
 regard to globalizing Switzerland’s digital infrastructure. It now equips the 
 Switzerland, which is well-known for its ascribed innovative capacity, with a 
new  purported modernity made in China.
This would have been hard to imagine at the time 
when Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. was founded in 1987—one year after 
 Dätwyler began producing fiber optic cables in Altdorf. The story of the  meteoric 
rise of Huawei has, by now, been told many times. Former People’s Liberation 
Army engineer Ren Zhengfei founded the company with only six  employees in 
Shenzhen, a city bordering Hong Kong in the southern Chinese province of 
Guangdong. In 1979, under the new leadership of political reformer Deng 
 Xiaoping, the area became one of the first four Special Economic Zones. Since 
then, the city on the Pearl River Delta has undergone rapid transformation—
from a former fishing village into the putative Silicon Valley of the East. In this 
special economic zone, private ownership, which had been prohibited in the 
Mao era, became possible in the high-tech sector in 1987. In the same year, 
eighty-five ICT companies, including Huawei, were established as so-called 
“people’s enterprises” (renmin qiye). They deeply diversified the landscape of 
China’s hitherto exclusively state-owned enterprises (guoyou qiye). Similar to 
the Chinese fiber optic companies, Huawei did not initially focus on develop-
ing its own components. Instead, the company mainly engaged in the telecom 
wholesale sector, trading with switches and other equipment.52
Over the course of recent decades, this has 
changed as Huawei has become a global ICT company. This rise is related to 
a unique framework of domestic and foreign policies. While the Chinese elec-
tronics industry had received special support since the founding of the PRC, 
the foreign firms that were allowed to enter the Chinese market during the 
period of reform also introduced new challenges to this industry. The result-
52
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ant fierce competition between foreign and Chinese firms as well as overca-
pacity in the Chinese market prompted Huawei to look for new overseas mar-
kets. This was facilitated by the PRC’s foreign policy, which since the 1990s 
gradually changed from a strategy of “attracting in” foreign technology to 
one of “going out.” In the early 2000s, the government encouraged Chinese 
companies through various instruments and forms of preferential treatment 
to go abroad and invest and set up operations in other countries. Huawei was 
one of them. Supported by these policies, the PRC surpassed Europe and the 
United States to become the main ICT-exporting country in 2004 and the 
largest exporter of telecom equipment in 2010.53
Huawei’s move abroad began in the mid-1990s, at 
just about the time when Hans Ulrich Dätwyler first came to China. However, 
the strategies of the two companies differed. Dätwyler had gained its initial 
 experience abroad three decades prior to Huawei, targeting economically 
well-off western European countries first. Huawei’s approach, in turn, was sim-
ilar to the strategy that founder Ren had initially followed within China, that is, 
to start from doing business in the economically poorer rural regions. Likewise, 
in going global, he first targeted the emerging markets in Asia, Africa, and  Latin 
America. The first step was an office in Hong Kong, followed by an entry into 
the Russian market in the late 1990s, which considerably benefited from official 
strategic diplomatic relationships between the People’s Republic and  Russia. 
In 1998, Huawei managed to enter other countries in Asia through  international 
bidding, and in 1998 and 1999 offices in Kenya and Brazil became the  company’s 
first offices in Africa and South America, respectively.54
Only after Huawei gained solid ground on these con-
tinents since the early 2000s did the company eventually expand to North 
America and western Europe. This trajectory was less smooth, however, and 
fraught with numerous difficulties and challenges due to inter-state and inter- 
capitalist competition. Huawei was markedly more successful in Europe than 
in the United States.55 It benefited from the European recession that followed 
the burst of the Internet bubble in 2001. The downturn forced operators to pro-
cure cheaper yet high-quality equipment, which was something that Huawei 
could offer. Similar to the way companies such as Dätwyler initially approached 
the Chinese market, Huawei aimed first at establishing joint ventures with  local 
companies in order to access the European market. In 2003, Siemens, a Ger-
man company involved in fiber optics and one that had been present in China 
since 1872 and had good contacts with the Chinese government, agreed to sign 
a cooperative contract. The breakthrough came in 2004, however, when  Huawei 
won major telecommunications bids in Sweden and the Netherlands.56
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 | Fig. 5 |   Manual inspection of fiber strands.
 | Fig 6 |  Loose tubes are being stranded together to form a cable, including strain relief and water-repellent protective coating. 
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 | Fig. 7 |  Quality check: The cable is measured and labeled.
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 | Fig. 8 |  Visual check of the completed cable.
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 | Fig. 9 |  Production plant in Altdorf with a view of the Uristock.
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Huawei’s official entry into the Swiss market— notably 
the last country in Europe where Huawei opened a branch  57—is thus to be seen 
in this context of European market expansion. Around that time, the company 
was basically unknown in Switzerland. The company’s first appearance in the 
Swiss Confederation was reportedly during an exhibition at the International 
Telecommunication Union’s trade fair in Geneva in 1999. At that time, “[e]very-
one was shocked that this sort of stuff was being made in China.”  58 Never-
theless, only industry experts took notice of this. 
In the following years, the company began to explore 
the Swiss market. According to Felix Kamer, Huawei Switzerland’s vice presi-
dent, who was part of the branch office’s founding team, Switzerland initially 
did not have a strategic role in the company’s business. Activities in  Switzerland 
were first coordinated by Huawei’s European headquarters in the German city 
of Düsseldorf and were later delegated to the Italian branch office in Milan.59 
From there, Toni Cheng (today the general manager of Alibaba’s European 
cloud business) traveled to Switzerland regularly by car to sell Huawei Data 
Card, a product that could provide a Wi-Fi hotspot to mobile phones at a time 
when mobile phones did not yet properly support Wi-Fi.60
The turning point for a proper Swiss branch was in 
2008, when the country’s major telecommunications provider Swisscom 
planned to modernize its network on the basis of fiber optics. Vivian Gong 
Frey, Huawei Switzerland’s chief technology officer, who was also part of the 
founding team, recalls the early beginnings of Huawei in Switzerland. Accord-
ingly, Huawei was among several companies that were invited by Swisscom 
to make an offer and join the bid. However, the company did not yet have an 
office in Switzerland, and the colleagues from Swisscom initially did not know 
how to set up the contact. They knew Toni Cheng, however, and thus simply 
sent their request for information (RFI) to his hotel room when he was visit-
ing Switzerland from Milan. At that time, people at Huawei hardly dared to 
dream that a seemingly high-end country such as Switzerland would even 
accept a Chinese vendor. However, says Mrs. Gong Frey, they presented a 
convincing, comprehensive, and solid network solution, which was devel-
oped directly in China.61 
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 A telephone system consists of sev-
eral hierarchical subsystems. Very 
roughly speaking, there are three 
layers. At the base, there is the local 
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Swisscom has 17 metro networks. 
The metro network connects the 
COs of cities, towns, and suburbs in 
a given  region. Third, on top of the 
hierarchy, there is the long-distance 
network or backbone, which con-
nects the different regional cen- 
ters and major cities and, from 
there, provides links to the networks 
of  dif ferent countries. Altogether, 
Swisscom has about 900 COs, 
 including access COs, metro COs, 
and a few backbone COs. Huawei 
connected all of them, for example 
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plained better in footnote 80, the 
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Yet, unlike Dätwyler Cabling, which was able to build 
upon the Chinese joint venture, Schindler, and its Swissness, Huawei first had 
to prove itself. After a test phase, the negotiations between Huawei and 
 Swisscom began.62 The first telecom equipment that Huawei sold to the latter 
in 2008 was high-capacity optical transport network (OTN) products to con-
nect the various central offices (CO) across Switzerland.63 Winning the 
 Swisscom bid was the go-ahead for the company’s business in Switzerland. A 
major requirement for being awarded the bid, however, was a local office. In 
setting up the business, they received strong support from the Bern  Economic 
Development Agency.64 Subsequently, in October 2008, Huawei registered an 
office.65 Toni Cheng became its head, reporting to Italy. In March 2009, he 
 began hiring a staff of four local and Chinese experts.66 Among them was a sen-
ior local, Felix Kamer, who had previously worked at Swisscom and had 
 received an offer from Huawei during a business trip to Shenzhen,67 and  Vivian 
Gong Frey, who was recruited as a senior network solution manager. 
Mrs. Gong Frey recalls that she started to work at 
Huawei Switzerland rather by happenstance. She had been living in  Switzerland 
since 2000 and spoke English as well as some German. Born in the Mao era, 
when women were supposed to “hold up half the sky,” and being a telecommu-
nications IT engineer with a degree from a top university in Beijing, she recalls 
that she was used to relative gender equality in technical fields. However, in this 
regard, Switzerland “was the biggest shock in my professional life!” At her first 
position in Switzerland, a managing role at a Canadian telecommunications 
company, “nobody talked to me unless they really needed to.” Nevertheless, she 
reports, she went on, quitting the job only when she gave birth to her daughter 
and the industry was shaken by the burst of the Internet bubble. 
Unexpectedly, on May 12, 2008, a major earthquake 
occurred in China’s Sichuan Province. Mrs. Gong Frey registered as a volunteer 
to assist the victims. When one of the organizers heard about her telecommu-
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nications background, she told her that Huawei was about to establish an office 
in Switzerland and put her in touch with Toni Cheng. Once Huawei officially 
launched its business in Switzerland, Toni Cheng invited her to join the team. 
She accepted the full-time position, although her friends from Switzerland, 
knowing that she was then the mother of a six-year-old, said: “Are you crazy?”  68
As Felix Kamer remembers, the founding team of 
five people “established Huawei Switzerland from scratch.”  69 With little time 
to find office space, they first started the business in a three-room apartment 
in Bern near Helvetiaplatz.70 They had to set up everything by themselves, from 
buying their own laptops and traveling to Milan in order to get the right soft-
ware from Huawei Italy, to going to IKEA and assembling the furniture pur-
chased there, to improvising office curtains made from bedsheets.71
In addition to assembling these infrastructural 
 materials, they had to develop intercultural understanding. As Felix Kamer 
notes, “Building trust is a challenge for any company, but it is much more 
 demanding across cultural borders.”  72 In the early years of working with 
Swisscom, says Vivian Gong Frey, “we had to act as a bridge to bring the two 
companies  together.” It was the first time they were using a Chinese product, 
and they had some doubts. The fact that the Huawei engineers could hardly 
speak English did not make things any easier. “We had to … do a cultural 
 exchange and integrate body language,” for example in intercultural work-
shops.73 During these workshops, Felix Kamer recalls, the Swiss and Chinese 
sides “talked about culture, food … We sang ‘Frère Jacques’ and ‘zhu ni shen-
gri kuaile’ [Happy Birthday to You] in Chinese.” The aspects of Switzerland that 
astonished his Chinese colleagues the most were the high cost of living, the 
impressive quality of services such as trains and buses always running on time, 
and public  services, as well as the way the Swiss could eat heavy meals such 
as cheese fondue.74 “I missed Chinese food,” recalls Vivian Gong Frey. “At first 
I didn’t know what to order at restaurants. I only knew spaghetti.”  75 
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Nowadays, Huawei Switzerland no longer orga nizes 
intercultural workshops: “We have a better understanding of how  Switzerland 
works, and the customers have also become more open.” Nevertheless, Felix 
Kamer asserts that “the language is a barrier.” While he spent one year in 
 Shenzhen recently, practicing Chinese characters with flash cards in the eve-
nings, his job kept him too busy to pick up more than rudimentary Mandarin.76 
To overcome such challenges, the staff of Huawei Switzerland is still made up 
of local, i.e. European, and Chinese employees, including people of Chinese 
origin with a Swiss passport. There is also a division of labor, with Chinese col-
leagues mainly being responsible for the technical side of the business and 
communication with headquarters.77 
Today, Huawei Switzerland has about 350  employees 
of thirty-three different nationalities  78 working in offices near Bern, Zurich, and 
Lausanne. Despite the ongoing discussion about cybersecurity, the company 
continues to grow. Moreover, it is about to open one or two major research 
centers, likely to be linked to ETH Zurich and / or EPFL in Lausanne. In times of 
a trade war and in view of not wanting to endanger negotiations on a free-trade 
agreement with the United States, however, it seems that the negotiations on 
the research centers have been kept discreet.79
In practice, Huawei can already be found nearly 
everywhere in Switzerland’s digital realm. Private consumers are addressed 
in advertisements for Huawei mobile phones on Switzerland’s streets and in 
its train stations. Moreover, the company provides a range of network systems 
and devices for enterprises and telecommunications providers. These include 
switches and routers,80 antenna components, wireless local area networks 
(WLAN), Internet of Things gateways, and security products. In the fixed tele-
communications network, for example, Huawei provides crucial components 
that link Switzerland’s older copper and coaxial networks to the fiber optic 
network.81 Universities also use Huawei components; these include Switzer-
land’s top technical university, ETH, which has distributed more than 3,000 of 
Huawei’s WLAN access points across its campus. When traveling up moun-
tainsides in the cable cars of Titlis Bergbahnen, skiers can now access Hua-
wei’s WLAN hotspots,82 and the National Swiss Ski Alpine Team is currently 
competing in Huawei racing bibs.83
Swiss data centers rely on Huawei technology as 
well—although they are not always willing to talk about this in public. Such 
technologies include, among other things, servers, storage solutions,  switches, 
and other network components, such as DWDM (Dense Wavelength Division 
Multiplexing).84 In short, the range of technologies offered by Huawei is wide. 
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Accordingly, one data center IT engineer from the University of Zurich recalls 
that, after having gone through five hours of product presentations with  Huawei 
engineers, “I just told them ‘okay, just tell me what you don’t have!’”  85
While furnishing Swiss infrastructures with optical 
network components, Huawei’s designers also draw inspiration from Swiss 
technologies—including in more unexpected ways. Huawei has invested 
1.5 billion Swiss francs in the construction of its new Ox Horn campus near 
Shenzhen in southern China. By November 2019, more than 10,000  employees, 
mostly research and development staff, had already moved there. Once con-
struction is complete, 25,000 people are expected to work there in twelve 
“ cities” that will imitate various European cities and regions such as Paris, 
 Verona, Oxford, Heidelberg, and Fribourg in Switzerland. An eight-kilometer 
rail network connects these places. The bright red, somewhat nostalgic  shuttle 
trains that run there are modeled after the Jungfraubahn, a famous Swiss  alpine 
train—an idea by Felix Kamer.86
 In conclusion, Swiss-Chinese digital infrastructures 
are interwoven in complex, multidirectional, and multifaceted ways—not only 
by cables and network devices, but also by the people behind these infrastruc-
tures. Accordingly, the digital technologies involved can hardly be assigned 
clearly to a single nation. Throughout the last century, Chinese engineers have 
been adapting technologies and know-how from the Soviet Union, Western 
Europe, North America, and Japan, by studying abroad, learning from foreign 
experts, and importing technologies. They have developed these  technologies 
into new Chinese versions, which are now finding their way back and promis-
ing a new modernity in their places of origin. At the same time, Swiss-made 
 fiber optic technologies such as cables or plugs often contain components 
made in China or the United States. In addition, the people who work at Swiss 
and Chinese fiber optic companies in Switzerland and contribute their time, 
labor, and skills are often from many different backgrounds. In practice, it is 
therefore difficult to draw clear national boundaries, whether with regard to 
Chinese technology or when it comes to the making of digital Switzerland.
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